DoesLawHaveanOutside?
JanetHalley * Let'simagineawomansittingatthekitchentable.Thehouseisdark,everyoneelseisasleep. Ithasbeenareallybadday.Shesuspectsthatthismayturnouttobethedayinwhichshe finally,irrevocablylosesfaithinhermarriage. Shehasbeenherebefore,andfeelsitiswithinherpowertoreenterthemarriagespiritually,to tryonemoretimetomakeitwork-ortogiveup,tothrowinthetowel,tomakeaplanfor leavingherhusband.Whatishernextstepinlife? As we know, there is no way out of marriage that does not involve the law. It is a legal relationship,andthestatejealouslyretainsamonopolyoverthepowertodissolveit.Butdoes ourwomanthinkaboutlegaldivorce,sittingatthekitchentable,inthesilenceofthesleeping house?Ordoherthoughtscenteronreligiousideas,onherneedforsafetyandsolace,onawe attheprospectoffundamentalchange,onherloveforthismanwhohassodisappointedher, ontheeroticthrillprovokedbytheideafreedomfromhim? ThewayIteachFamilyLaw,shethinksaboutlaw-eventhoughIknowshedoesn'talways.She gathersuptheideasshehasaboutdivorce,andmakesacost/benefitanalysisofhersituation.I wantmystudentstoimaginethatsheasksherself:whatwouldhappenifwedivorced,wouldI landonmyfeetorbedestroyed?CouldIkeepthehouse?DoImakesurethechildrengetto havehislove,ordoIneedtosavethechildrenfromhisbadinfluence,andineithercasecouldI doit?CouldIincreasethenumberofhoursIworkorwouldIlosehishelpwiththekidsand havetoworkless,earnless?ThewayIteachFamilyLaw,shelosesorsavesherfaithinthe marriage in part because of what this cost/benefit analysis tells her. And if she stays in the marriage,thelawofdivorce,asshehasimaginedit,conditionsherbargainingpowerwithher husbandfromhereonin:themarriagewillhavetogetevenworsebeforeshewillhitherstrike priceandleavehim,andshe'llhavetoabsorballthemarriage'scostsplusthatdeterioration,if ithappens.Thelawofdivorcewillconditiontheamountofmisery,orviolence,orforbearance, or despair she will have to endure; it may route both of them back into a slow, painful but genuine reconciliation; it will also condition small things, like who takes out the garbage. I teach my students to think of the legal rules as mattering even when they are not applied, becausepeopledoimaginetheirapplicationandguidetheirconductinlightofwhattheyhave envisioned. IhavesomelegaltheoryonmysidewhenIdothis. IstartmycoursewithRobertHale Here'showthese theoreticalpreparationsgo. Hale confronted a legal academy and policy universe which imagined that contract was the preeminentlegalrelationship,andthatfreedomofcontractwasatitscore.AccordingtoHale's laissezfaireinterlocutors,thewagepaidtoaworkerbyanindustrialistwasfreelynegotiated betweenthem;ifthestateintervenedinthatfreedomtoregulatethetermsoftheircontract, thewillofthestatehadsupplantedthewilloftheparties,andthefreedomofboththeworker andtheindustrialisthadbeencurtailed. Haleshiftedhisfocusfromcontracttoproperty.Thisisthemovefromtheforegroundrulesto thebackgroundrules.Theworkerandtheindustrialistbecamethepropertylessmanandthe property owner. And the rules of property, sitting there in the background, didn't merely influencethewage;theycoercedit.Thepropertylessmancomestothesituationwithoneand onlyonenonlegalattribute:heisabeingwhomusteatordie.Everysinglestrategyhemight actually adopt to get food confronts him with a world paved wall to wall with the rules of property.Shallheeatthatbagofpeanutssittingonthecounter?Ithasanowner,andthough thatownerhasthelegalpowertogiveittothepropertylessman,healsohasthelegalrightto refuse to do so, and to convey it to him only for a price. In the actual world, the owners of peanutsareallinsistingonaprice.Ok,sonopeanuts.Thepropertylessmancouldgrowsome food. But that requires land, and this means of production is also within the power of a propertiedman,whocanpermitthepropertylessmantostartagardenonhisland,butwho neednot.Thelandownercaninsteadrefuseaccesstoitunlessheispaidafeeforitsuse-and alltheactuallandowners,asithappens,doinsistonthepaymentofrent.Ok,sonofarming. The propertyless man could make something valuable to sell for money, and try again at the peanuts:butthefactorsofindustrialproductionare,again,property.Theirownerscanpermit ourhungryherotousethem,butalltheactualownersrefusetodosointheformofrent;they insistonwagelaborthatresultsin theirownershipofthethingsproduced.Thepropertyless man,aswe'vesaid,musteat:sohesellshislabortotheindustrialistandtakeshomeawage. That wage, Hale insists, though it is negotiated between the employer and the employee, is coerced -its size is determined by the rules of property. It is a legal artifact; and law, even whenithoversinthebackgroundandmerelyconditionsratherthandictatestheoutcomeofa bargain,coercesitintoexistenceandcoercesitsterms. Hale was at pains to insist that coercion wasn't necessarily bad; he thought that the widely sharedreluctancetousethetermtodescribethelaw'scontributiontolaborcontractswasthe resultofitsbeingunnecessarilyfreightedwithmoralnegativity.Dropthenormativebaggage and we could talk about degrees and kinds of coercion as endemic, not special. When Kornhauser and Mnookin returned to Hale's idea, and incorporated it specifically in a classic article on the law of divorce, they rejected this: for them, a husband and wife negotiating (ratherthanlitigating)theirdivorcewereengagedinprivateordering.IfweextendKornhauser and Mnookin, and imagine the husband and wife to silently decide who will take out the garbagebasedontheirsilentsenseofeachpartner'sstrikepricefordivorce,thistooisprivate ordering.Inbothsettings,thehusbandandwifearebargainingintheshadowofthelaw.For Hale,bargainingintheshadowofthelawislegallycoerced;forMnookinandKornhauser,it's legallyconditionedbutfree. Ithinkit'smuchmorepowerfultothinkofthelawofdivorceasconditioningnotonlydivorce negotiations but garbage decisions; and to think of it as coercive rather than as setting the contextforprivateordering.First,thisisthelegalrealistwayoftryingtoputacheckonthe liberalideathatlaw'spurposeisachievedwhenlawrunsoutandfreedombegins.Itexposes theideaoffreedomofcontracttobeideology,liberalideology.Ifbeingaleftistisstandingto theleftofliberalism,whereverliberalismisatanyparticularmoment,thenHale'sinsistenceon coercionopensuppossibilitiesforaleftcritique. Second,thisexpansiveviewoflawasksustodosomethingverydifficult,somethingthathas become even more difficult after the partial convergence of left legalism with subordinationfocused identitypolitics:itasks usto think ofcoercionasmorallyneutral, andtoground our moraland/orpoliticaljudgmentsonsomethingotherthanthefactthatpowerhashadeffects. OnceagainHalecanguideus.Itisnotonlythepeanutownerandthefactoryownerandthe landownerwhocanrefusetoenterintoalaborcontract:so,upuntilthepointofstarvation, canthepropertylessman.Heisactingcoercivelywhenherefusesaproposedlaborcontract becausehethinkshecangetahigherwageorbetterworkingconditionselsewhere.Haleposits thatthewageearnerispaidmorethantheentirelyself-interestedslaveownerwouldpayto maintain a slave, and that that increment is precisely the mark of the wage earner's countercoercivepower. This move opens up an idea that has been anathema to the strong structural-subordination thesesoftheidentity-politicalwingofthelegalleft.Theyseepowerasbeingoverandtheir identity groups as being under; power is bad; and the solution for the identity groups is emancipation,liberation,equality.Theideathatthesolutionfortheidentitygroupsmightbe tounderstandandmarshalltheircountercoercivepowerhasbeenhardforpeopleinvestedin structuralsubordinationpremisestoimagine.Theunnecessarypresumptionthatpowerisbad blocksbothanalysisandstrategy. Third,Hale'smoveshiftsresponsibilityforoutcomesbackontolaw.Itasksustothinkoflawas havingdistributionaleffects.AsHaleconcludes,themyriadinteractionsofallthepropertied men and propertyless men as they negotiate labor contracts determines the wealth of every maninthatsocialorder.Seeinglawasintrinsictothisimmense sortingprocessallowsusto seeitasdistributive. These theoretical orientations ask us to look at law but also through it, to a world that is contingent on it. Here is an example of why looking at law alone can be misleading, drawn fromKornhauserandMnookin.Whenmarriedparentsdivorce,thestateprovidestherulesfor whogetsthekids.IntheUS,ourcurrentmainlineruleistoallocatecustodyaccordingtothe "bestinterestsofthechild."Ifweonlylookatlaw,thisbitofitisnicelyreassuring:itmakesit looklikewereallycareaboutthewelfareofchildren.ButasKornhauserandMnookinpoint out, best interests is a completely open-ended standard: if the husband and wife were to litigate custody, they would do so under insurmountable uncertainty about who would win. ThenMnookinandKornhauserposit(andthisisjusthypothetical)thattheparentwhoshould getcustody-theonewhoshouldwinabest-interestscontest-isalsotheonewhoisthemost riskaverseonthispoint.Taketherule(orrather,inthiscase,thestandard),addonebasicidea frombargainingtheoryandshezam:yougetaparentwhoistooscaredtolitigatecustody.He orshewillnegotiateifpossible,andinthenegotiationsheorshewillcaveonotherissuesto secureprimarycustodyoratleastmoretimewiththechildren.Heorshemayimpoverishhimorherselftogetcustody-andmayimpoverishthekidsintheprocess.Ifthathappens,you get a divorce negotiation in which the parent whom we have designated, ex hypothesi, the betterparentsuffersadebilitatingblowdealtbytheveryrulethat-onitsface-favoredhim orher.Bestinterestssoundslikepolicyfavoringthechildren;butinactionitcanbetheexact opposite.Itdoesn'thavetobethatway,butitcanbe.Bestinterestsisascoerciveasarule requiring nonowners to get the consent of owners before eating their peanuts or using their toolsorcultivatingtheirland.Wewon'tknowwhetherthat'sgoodorbaduntilwelookatthe outcomes. ThoseareatleastsomeofthereasonsIliketoteachFamilyLawasawebofbackgroundrules that condition people's intimate dealing not only on the night of crisis, but in everyday humdrum decisions, even on the first serious date. You could say that my approach is imperialisticforlaw;thewayIteachit,lawalwaysmatters. Let me take you down a different route to the same point. Let's say that, because we are lawyers,weregarditasanimportantthingtobeabletosaywhatthelawis.Andheretheset textforlegalrealism,theuber-canonicalgranddaddypieceofwritingissurelyOliverWendall Holmes'"PathoftheLaw."
3 Inthatessay,Holmescounseledthat,ifwereallywanttoknow whatthelawis,weneedtoseeitastheBadMandoes.Holmes'BadManisnotanoutlaw:he wantstoavoidalegalsanction,andthustoavoidbreakingthelaworatleasttoavoidbeing sanctionedforbreakingthelaw;buthealsowantstoactasself-interestedlyashecanshortof that.Hereadsthelawnotforitsaspirationalreachbutforitslimits;notforitsmoralclaims, butforitsimplicitpermissions.ThisiswhatmakeshimBad.TheBadManthusdividesthe worldintotheLawandtherangeofpermittedactionthathecanindulgeinbeyondthelawandifwewouldseethelawthatway,Holmesargues,wewouldseewhatthelawis. Let'sgobacktobestintereststoseewhatthismightmean.Bestinterestspurportstosaythat children of divorcing parents will get the custody arrangement that is best for them. But we allowdivorcingparentstonegotiatethetermsoftheirdivorces,andthusweallowBadParents toinsistongettingalotofcustodyfromriskaverseGoodOnesandthentotradetheirchildtimebackforconcessionsonpropertydivision,alimony,andevenchildsupport.Withinvery exiguouslimits,courtswillapprovetheiragreementsandevenadoptthemasdecrees.That, Holmeswouldhaveusknow,isasmuchthelawasthepredictionthatabenevolentjudgewill ascertainthechild'sbestinterestsandsecurethem.Andit'snotaperversionofthelaw;itis thelaw. This is an important move in legal realist thought, and in critical legal analysis. It is almost exactlytheoppositeofHale'sprocedure,whichwastopavethepropertylessman'sworldwith law. For Holmes, the goal is "a right study and mastery of the law as a business with well understood limits, a body of dogma enclosed within definite lines."
4 At some point, thelawruns out.ButitwouldnotberighttosaythattheBadManisfreetoactinthedomainwherelaw runsout.TheBadManisbydefinitionactingwithinlaw.Aslongashemodifieshisconductin deference to a fear of legal sanction, he occupies a space of permission, not freedom. The scopeofthatdomain,itscontents,everythingaboutitslandscape,arecreatedbythelaw.It'sa littleliketheimageofthevasethatisalsotheimageofaface,butneverbothatthesametime because our heuristic incapacity keeps us from seeing both at once. The law defines the domainofpermittedaction,butwecan'tknowtheformerexceptasthenegativeofthelatter. Holmeslimitedhimselftothepredictionofwhatcourtswilldo,butofcoursetherealistswere firmthatthewholepanoplyofwhatKarlLlewellyncalled"lawmen"constitutedtherelevantset ofactors.HereisLlewellyn'sextensionofHolmes'idea,tobefoundinhisargumentthatthe riseofdivorcewasgoingtochangemarriage:
Whatwillinthispaperhereafterbemeantby"law"is….infirstinstance and especially all that the lawmen do, as such. 
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ComparedtoHolmes',Llewellyn'sisasignificantlyexpandedlegaldomain.Allthethingsthat all the lawmen do, all the things one can reasonably predict that they will do, the rules they apply, the ideologies they hold, and the ideologies that "other folk" have about them -no matter how contradictory, these are all "law"; and ultimately they matter because of "any effects"thattheyhaveon"otherpeople.""Otherpeople"existbeyondthelaw;butonceany oftheelementsoflawhave"anyeffects"onthem,theycomeinasthenecessaryobjectsof legalstudy. Iwanttocallthislawasitseffects.Oneofthemostdifficultchallengesofdoinglegalstudyin this tradition is finding some way of containing and ordering the almost crazy-making complexityoflawseenthisway.Hereisanexample,frommyownworkinprogressonsamesexmarriageaswehaveitintheUS.Whensame-sexmarriageadvocatesbegantoseethat they would win recognition for same-sex marriage in some state courts, they also began to arguethatmarriagesvalidinafirst-moverstatewouldbevalidinalltheotherstates,through theoperationoftheFullFaithandCreditClauseoftheFederalConstitution.
6
Nevermindthat there is no basis in positive Full Faith law for this claim; it's not absolutely contradicted by positivelaw,andittookthelawreviewsquiteawhiletoprintallthespinthatadvocateswere willing to put on that gap in the rules. By that time, opponents to same-sex marriage had gottenreallyalarmedandangry:wouldredstateshavetorecognizefirst-mover-statesame-sex marriages, despite adamant popular, legislative and judicial opposition within their borders? Theydiscoveredarulethatsitsquietlyinjudicialdoctrine,sayingthatamarriagevalidwhereit is performed is valid in another state as long as this second state does not make it illegal or consideritaseriousviolationofitspublicpolicy.ThisisthepoliticaloriginoftheDOMA's-the DefenseofMarriageActsstipulating,for40statesplusfederallaw,thatmarriageisarelation betweenamanandawoman.Thesearedeclarationsofrepugnancytopublicpolicy,andtheir purpose was to tell state courts not only that there will be no same-sex marriage within the DOMA state, but also that same-sex marriages travelling in from elsewhere cannot be recognizedasvalidmarriagesthere.Theywillfallnotwithintherulerequiringrecognition,but initsexceptionpermittingnonrecognition. Let'sgobacknowtoourwomansittingatakitchentablewonderingwhetherhermarriageis falling apart, but this time let's give her a woman for a spouse. Let's say they married in Massachusetts,andlivethere.FarawayisthestateofVirginia,astatewithaferociouslystrong DOMA.TheVirginiaDOMAnotonlybarsrecognitionofsame-sexmarriages;itbarsrecognition of same-sex civil unions, same-sex partnership contracts and even any "other arrangement entered into by persons of the same sex"! All of these are void and unenforceable; nor may theygiverisetocontractrights. 7 IfwefollowLlewellyn,theinvalidityofourwoman'smarriagein40statesoftheUnionandin almost all applications of federal law is an intrinsic characteristic of her marriage. You might thinkthismakeshermorevulnerable,butlet'smakeheraBadWoman.Let'ssupposeitdawns onherthat-ifsheandherspousemovedtoVirginia,shecouldjustwalkoutonherpartner, taking far more of their shared assets than what Massachusetts divorce law would give her. She could even take far more than Virginia contract law would give her, because Virginia's DOMA blocks contract enforcement in their "relationship." Even if her spouse moved to a same-sex-marriage-recognizingstateandsuedfordivorce,andeventuallygotadivorcedecree thatyouwouldthinkVirginiacourtswouldhavetoheedundertheFullFaithandCreditclause, there'scaselawgivingthemanout.TheirmarriageisbothvalidinMassachusettsandinvalid almosteverywhereelse,andwhereit'sinvalid,dependingonthefacts,it'salsoindissoluble. If we follow Holmes and Llewellyn again, the complex richochet pattern of powers and vulnerabilities that this choice of law regime creates between the parties to a Massachusetts same-sex marriage are part of these marriages even if they never leave Massachusetts and eveniftheyneverbreakup.TheBadWomanexercisehasshownusthepermissionsbuiltinto thesystem,andtheyarejustasrealasitsprescriptions. ThelineofthinkingthatI'vebeenpursuingsofarisboldinitsambitionsforlaw:notmuchis "beyond"it.Itanimatesmywork;itanimatesworkIadmire;thesensethatitisdifficultand newandthatalotofpeoplearetryingtofigureitoutgivesthelietotheideathatcriticallegal studiesaredead.Butthereisabigproblemwiththiswayofdoingthings:it'softenjustsimply wrong.Let'sgobacktoHale,wherewestarted.Hispointthatcoercionisubiquitouscollapses if we undo the enclosures and restore the commons. The only reason his propertyless man can't grow his own food is because the legal order Hale knew best imagined the whole territorialworldtobemappedonagridofrecordeddeeds.Also-ourpropertylessmancan eatifhemarriesarichwife,orwinsthelottery,orjoinsamonasteryorcommune.Ofcourse allthosemoves-tothecommons,tomarriage,tothewelfarestate,tocommunallife-throw him into contact with other background rules, so perhaps Hale's world-paved-with-law vision canberestoredsimplybypitchingit1,2,3……."n"levelsofgeneralitylower.Butifweare going to go all the way, don't we have to admit at some point that some of the background systemsthatmatteraren'tlegal?Afterall,thefactthathemusteatisnotaproductoflaw. Whatifhispsyche,hisaestheticsense,hisageandstaminaplayarole?Maybemysolitary womandecidestostayinhermarriagenotbecausesheanticipatesthatdivorcewouldbetoo 7 Va.CodeAnn. §20-45.3(2004) .TheargumentabovedependsonthecontinuingconstitutionalityoftheDOMAs.
IftheyaredecisivelyheldtobeunconstitutionalbytheUSSupremeCourt-andlitigationcurrentlyunderwaymay well eventually result in this holding -then the entailments elaborated above will no longer be a plausible predictionofwhatthelawmenwilldo.SeePerryv.Schwarzeneger,702F. Supp.2d1132(N.D.Cal.2010 .Onthe otherhand,iftheSupremeCourteventuallyfindsaplaceintheUSConstitutionalorderfortheDOMAs,thenthe predictionsmadeabovewillcontinuetocometrue. costly but because she likes her husband when he isn't drunk and doesn't want to lose the pleasureofhiscompany.Whatifshebargainsintheshadownotoflawbutofherownhedonic vitality? I'vebeen pondering this problem asI participated inthissparkling conferencetitled "Beyond the Law": What, if anything, is "beyond the law"? The better parent's risk aversion; the propertyless man's hunger: should we insist that these are nonlegal attributes about these characters which interact with legal rules to condition legally important decisions? Are they insideoroutsideofthelaw? Wecanthinkofiteitherway.Mostofthetime,tobesure,I'mengagedindescriptiveprojects thatarebasicallyattemptstoextendthereachoflaw.NotthatIwantittobebig;I'mtryingto understand how big it is. But in the rest of rest of my remarks I'd like to spool out my ambivalenceaboutthis.Whydoesitfeelmorecritical,moredecisive,toinsistonthecoercive characterofbackgroundrules,nomatterhowfarinthebackgroundtheylurk?Andwhydoes theresultingpictureoftheworldseemsonarrowed,soreduced,oncewehavesucceededin drawing it? What's at stake in positing that law is everywhere -or that there is something beyondit? Let's take a break from law completely to see what can be said on the other side of this ambivalence.Let'sgo"beyondlaw."I'vegottenmyselfinhotwaterwithsomefeministsofmy generation by arguing that it might be useful, might be revealing, might open us up to unforeseen social understandings and new, important political alliances to take a break from feminism.
8 AndI'mthecoeditorofacollectionofessayswithEnglishprofessorAndrewParker inwhichweaskedagroupofnotableproducersofqueertheorywhetherthereisanythingin theirworkthatcouldbedescribedas"beyond"sexand/or"beyond"queertheory.
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I'vegotten someprettysharprebukesforthese"beyond"moves.Forsomepeoplewhoareworkinghard toexpandtheexplanatorypowerandsocialspaceforfeminismorqueertheory,itisnothing shortoffrighteningandenragingtohearsomeoneontheleft--someonewhohasbenefittedin a million ways from feminism and queer theory and who wouldn't have ever gotten an academicpostfromwhichtoquestionthemwithoutthem-suggestingthatitmightbegoodto positalimittothem.Whydoit?Whydoittwice? OnereactionIgettothese"takeabreak"proposalstipsmeoffthatI'mright:theclaimthatit's impossibletotakeabreakfromfeminismorfromqueertheorywithoutgoingseriouslywrong becausewomen'ssubordinationorendangeredsexualdesireistheprimummobileofwhatever needsexplainingorfixing.Thesearestructuralisthypotheses;thosewhoespousethemposita deep structure to human life, and dedicate themselves to discovering it and its pervasive influence in parts of life that seem utterly innocent of it. They demand of themselves a hermeneutics of suspicion, a will to unmask; a vigilance to undo common sense. But even more,theydemandacertainepistemicfixity:theworldmaylookasthoughwe'rebeyondmale domination,beyondsexualrepression-butwe'renot. Oneoftheoddthingsaboutthiswidelysharedreaction,though,isthatthirdwavefeminism becamepossibleonlythroughabreakwithintellectualandpoliticalideasofsexandsexuality prevailing in the 1960's; and queer theory became possible only when some political, social, intellectual and libidinal energies that were effervescing in the late 1980's and early 1990's focusedthemselvesonadesiretounderstandsexualityintermsotherthanfeminist.Feminism wasbornsaying"No"totheideasaboutgenderinwhichitemerged.Queertheorywasmore ambivalent; the idea behind about half of queer theory at the time it emerged wasn't to contradictfeminism,buttoaddtoit.Toworkonanotherdimension.Touseotherkeyterms. Ok, so contradictions might emerge; but that could be good for feminism, good for our understandingofsexuality. Thequeerbreakwasanimatedbyananti-structuralistimpulse;itfomentedastrongcritiqueof identity,of"categories,"ofknowledge,andoftruth.Oneofthemostproductivethingsabout it, in my view, was the way it shook up our ideas about power. Coming into it, many of its inventors were all feminists all the time, and our feminism was about bad, top-down power. Wewerecommittedtoananti-subordinationproject.Someofusimaginedwomen'spoweras redemptive; some thought that power itself was irredeemable. We ran smack dab into Foucault's History of Sexuality Volume 1, one of the canonical texts of the queer break. 10 Foucaultwrotethatbook-itwasfirstpublishedinFrenchin1976-tofindanalternativeto theFreudianideathatsexualdesirewasthedeepest,truest,mostpersonalthingabouteachof us,andthatintheinfancyofeachofusithadboweddowntotheLawoftheFatherbyallowing itselftobecomerepressed.Foucaultthoughtinsteadthat,attheverytimethatthisrepressive force was supposedly in its most magnificent heyday, sexuality was being producedproliferated-intheprofusionofrepressiveapparatusesthatspannedVictoriansociety.They weren't effectively repressive -if anything, they were immensely productive. The problem wassexualityitself,notitsrepression.Heimaginedthatwecouldloosenthe"grip"ofsexuality onourbodiesandourpleasuresifweimaginedpowerotherwise.Power,heposited,mightnot be the Law; we needed to get beyond the idea that it primarily resides in the King and his Sword;itmightbeanimmanentwebofhighlymobileimpulsesrunningthroughouthumanlife, congealingsometimesinconcentratedforcefulenergiesthatcouldamounttodomination,but more usually dispersed, small, and fluid. Power might include rather than oppose itself to resistance. 
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Thisisapictureofpowerbeyondlaw,andasmuchasFoucaultyearnedtobelieveitwhenhe wrote Volume 1, he didn't really. The idea that sexuality had a grip on our bodies and pleasuresandthatwemustengageinadeepstrategytogetfreeofit-thatveryideaisbuilton the form of power-over; of domination; of the Law as the Law of the Father, the Law as the sword of the prince. The Foucault of Volume One had not achieved the transformation of powerthatHalehadsuccessfullywroughtmanyyearsbefore,workingoncoercion. 11 American Queer Theory inherited this partially achieved break with the Law, and one of the reasonsithasneverfittoowellintocriticalstudiesinthelawschoolisthatthisimageoflawis so unlike the one we inherit from legal realism. The paranoid attitude that the Foucault of Volume 1 managed to preserve toward the confessor, the psychiatrist, and the King with his Sword-despitehisfamousreformulationsaboutpower-hastroubledqueertheoryacrossits entireexpanse,anddrasticallynarroweditsexpectationsofwhatitmighthearfromqueersin law.Allthemoreimportant,then,toobservethecompletetransformationinFoucault'sideas about law and about power in Volume 2 of his History of Sexuality. This book was first published in French in 1984 -almost a decade after Volume 1.
12 Studying late antique conductbooks,Foucaultdiscoveredtheunimportanceofwhathecalledthe"moralcode"-the rulesaboutwhatsexualthingsoneshouldandshouldnotdo.Instead,theemphasisofthese books fell on inculcating an attitude of self-observation, self-management; the experience of sexualityasproblematicresultedinanideaoftheselfasself-governing.Becomingthesubject ofsexualdesireswasbecominganethicalsubject,asubjectinrelationshiptoitself;asubject whose characteristic form of power is self-observation and self-management. "I am not supposingthatthecodesareunimportant,"Foucaultwrote.Buttheywerenotlegalmandates; they gave shape to practices of self-governance, practices which one would perform in their shadowinawaythatwasconditionedonthembutneitherliberatednordominated."[T]hisis thehypothesisthatIwouldliketoexplorehere-thatthereisawholerichandcomplexfieldof historicityinthewaytheindividualissummonedtorecognizehimselfasanethicalsubjectof sexual conduct." 13 Thus the rule requiring the husband to confine his sexual conduct to his wife,forexample,wasnotarepressiveprohibition;itwashisopportunitytoachievenotselfdenialbutanethicalrelationshiptohimself-andthat,nottheunleashingofforbiddendesire orasubsidenceintobodiesandpleasures,offeredhimfreedom. Ibid.,at32.
